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How best to coordinate the Federal government's multi-agency efforts to 
curb illicit traffic in dangerous drugs has once again become an issue of 
major interest to the Congress. Critics of the current Administration's 
anti-drug program contend that it lacks an overall strategy a n d .  that it 
suffers from the absence of a central mechanism for the formulation of 
general policy as well as for the broad direction of operations. A number of 
bills pending in the 98th Congress are designed to remedy the perceived 
deficiency, through the establishment of an agency with explicit authority 
over the development and implementation of all Federal government efforts to 
control drug traffic. Frequently described in the press as "drug czar" 
proposals, these measures are opposed by the Reagan Administration on the 
grounds that such an agency is unnecessary and would be potentially 
disruptive. 
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I. Immediate Background 
On Jan. 14, 1983, ?resident Reagan exercised a pocket veto on an omnibus 
crime control bill passed during the closing hours of the 97th Congress. His 
principal objection to the measure was that it contained a provision for a 
so-called "8rUg czar" office, to be known as the "Office of the Director of 
National and International Drug Operations and Policy." The agency, the 
director and deputy director of which were to be subject to Senate approval, 
would have been authorized to --- 
(A) develop, review, implement, and enforce U.S. 
Government policy with respect to illegal 
clrugs; 
(B) direct and coordinate all U.S. Government 
efforts to halt the flow into, and sale and 
use of illegal drugs within the U.S.; 
(C) develop in concert with other Federal 
entities concerned with drug control the 
budgetary priorities and allocations of 
those entities with respect to illegal 
drugs; and 
(D) coordinate the collection and dissemination 
of information necessary to implement U.S. 
.- - - - -  p - , ' y C  - - -  4 - 7 ,  ,!,<t?. r e g - e r t  tc ill$csl " . . 
In connection with the drug czar provision, the President's memorandum of 
disapprovai stated: 
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The creation of another layer of bureaucracy 
within the Executive Branch would produce friction, 
disrupt effective law enforcement, and could threaten 
the integrity of criminal investigations and 
prosecutions -- the very opposite of what its 
proponents apparently intend. 
He contended moreover, that "although [the provision's] aim -- with which I 
am in full agreement -- is to promote coordination, this can be and is being 
achieved through existing administrative structures." 
The President's assertion that coordination is being achieved under the 
present system is challenged in a report recently issued by the General 
Accounting Office. (Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Strong Central 
Oversight; GGD-83-52; June 13, 1983). Focusing on drug interdiction, the GAO 
found that, although the level of cooperation among the principal agencies 
concerned has been increasing, the fragmentation of authority and 
responsibility "has a certain amount of inefficiency and interagency conflict 
built in." In particular, the GAO points out, "congressional oversight and 
executive branch resource allocation decisions relative to drug interdiction 
are difficult under these circumstances." Accordingly, the agency recommended 
that the President --- 
-- direct the development of a more definitive 
Federal drug strategy that stipulates the 
roles of the various agencies with drug 
enforcement responsibilities and 
-- make a clear delegation of responsibility 
to one individual to oversee Federal drug 
enforcement programs. 
Historical Perspective 
For close to 100 years the Federal government has been involved in efforts 
to curb the non-therapeutic use of dangerous drugs. Beginning in 1887, with 
enactment of a law that forbade the importation of opium into the United 
States by subjects of the Emperor of China, a long series of statutes has- 
created a major Federal role in the regulation of drug commerce and in the 
enforcemeiit cf restricticns designed to prevent the abase of Crugs. 
As a matter of course, the responsibility for administering and enforcing 
Federal drug control laws has been divided. Since many of the most 
restricted drugs enter the country illegally from abroad, the agencies 
charged with policing the national borders -- the Customs Service, the Coast 
Guard, and the Border Patrol -- have an important part to - play. Regulation 
of ~ h e  domestic drug industry is the province of bot9 the Drug Enforcemeni 
Administration (DEA) and the Food and Drug Administra~ion, whiie in addition 
the DEA has authority for the investigation 0-f violations invoiving dangerous 
C!rugs and for iiaison with foreign law enforcement officials in matters 
m p C ~ : p ;  - - _  " 7  t? ~ ? ~ T c T ? ~ . ' c  c ? ~ , : ?  - n n C - n l  - - . . - . . - . 
Other agencles wlth drug control responslbllitles are: the Federal Bureau 
of Invest;gat~oii (FBI!; t h e  Esreau cf Internaticnal Narcotics Xatterz ~n the 
State Department; the FeSeral Av:ac:sr~ Agency;  he Incernal Revenue Service; 
- zrle ̂ "--c - _ i _ i L  cf ; : s=~=e  .:-ss:s-a:-.=o, : ~ c c & r c "  2 - 5  St&=:st:-s i C , * ; E z j ;  t r - e  h ~ e r = y  
CRS- 3 IB83168 UPDATE-11/23/83 
for International Development; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; 
and the Department of Agriculture. Additionally, there is the necessary 
participation of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department and of U.S. 
Attorneys. 
Especially during the past 15 years, the level of the Federal commitment 
to Control of drug abuse has increased substantially. Spending for "law 
enforcement" related to this purpose rose from $37 million in FY 1969 to 
approximately $1.05 billion in FY83. The same years saw the initiation, or 
significant increase, of Federal programs to reduce the demand for drugs -- 
through treatment, education and primary prevention. 
Given the number of agencies chat have in some way become involved in drug 
Control during recent years, and the inevitable conflicts generated in 
consequence, it would be surprising if Calls for coordination had not been 
sounded previously. Indeed, along with a number of other approaches, the 
'loverlord" system itself has already been tried -- in a structure 
established, in 1971, by former President Richard Nixon. 
In declaring a "War on Drug Abusev President Nixon was responsible for a 
number of initiatives to alleviate the problem that was at the time causing 
such a high degree of public concern. Among them was the creation of the 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP)', headed by a 
director which the press at that time labelled "the drug czar." Placed in the 
Executive Office of the President, the agency was authorized to supervise and 
be responsible for all Federal drug abuse programs involving prevention, 
education, treatment, training and research. 
In initial discussions at the White House, the Nixon drug czar plan had 
envisioned the inclusion of law enforcement functions. within the scope of the 
office's concerns. However, reportedly it was argued with persuasion -- by 
the Justice Department and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs -- 
that a director who would have the necessary stature in both the law 
enforcement and the treatment-prevention communities could not be found. It 
was further argued, also with effect, that of these two general areas the 
treatment-prevention side was at that time in greater need of central 
direction. 
In 1972, the year following Presidential establishment of the new agency, 
Congress provided a statutory base, for a 3-year period, through the Drug 
Abuse Office and Treatment Act. Two key congressional findings noted in the 
Ieqislaticn were as folloks: 
The effectiveness of efforts by State and local 
governments and by the Federal Government to 
control and treat drug abuse in the United States 
has been hampered by a lack of coordination among 
;he States, bet wee^ Sraces and localities, and 
throughout the Federal establlsnment. 
Contrcl of drug aSuse requires the development of 
2 -. - - - - r n h g y c ; ~ r n :   - . - - . . I h - l - t p y m  Tf3er~' 
strategy that encompasses both effective law 
enforcement against illegal drug traffic and 
.effeztive health ~ r ~ g r a r n s  to rekabilitate victirr.~ 
of drug abuse. 
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Although finding substantial support for the addition of law enforceme-nt 
efforts to the coordinative jurisdiction of SAODAP, a fact reflected in the 
above findings, Congress acceded to the Administration view that the office 
should have no effective power over drug law enforcement agencies. The 
exclusion of such authority continued, during the years of the agency's 
operation, to draw criticism. 
Despite the existence of SAODAP, conflicts and the lack o f .  a unified 
objective continued in evidence, and in 1973 -- 2 years after the 
coordinating agency had been created -- the National Commission on Marihuana 
and Drug Abuse could still find that in SAODAP's designated sphere of 
operation "the fragmentation of authority threatens to defeat its attempt to 
organize federal and state activities into an integrated response, under 
Clear and understandable policy guidelines." 
The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, established by an act 
of Congress and partially appointed by President Nixon, had been given the 
task of conducting two comprehensive studies -- one on the country's 
marihuana problem and what to do about it and the second on the problem of 
drug abuse in general and the appropriate national response. In its detailed 
report on the general drug problem, the Commission described the development, 
during the preceding five years, of a "drug abuse industrial complex" -- 
marked by duplication of effort, uncertainty of direction 'and a lack of 
interagency coordination.'' Above all, the Commission noted the emergence of 
a large Federal drug bureaucracy, "displaying the common propensity of 
bureaucratic infrastructures to turn short-term programs into never-ending 
projects." 
Despite the fact that coordination and a unified policy were still eluding 
the government when the ~ a t i o n a l  Commission wrote its report, the panel gave 
SAODAP credit for making progress in that direction. However, the commission 
reCCmmended a far more radical approach to the coordination problem than any 
proposed before or since: the creation of a single agency with responsibility 
fCr all primarily drug-related functions, both for the formulation of policy 
and for actual day-to-day operations. The recommendation envisioned that the 
agency director would have sub-cabinet rank but would nevertheless report 
directly to the President. 
Although supporting the concept of a single drug control agency -- with 
the suggestion that it be called the Controlled Substances Administration -- 
the National Commission acknowledged two alternatives: 
(1) that the system in effect at the time might be 
continued "in the hope that SAODAP will more 
effectively utilize its statutory authority 
to bring some order out of administrative 
chaos" or 
( 2 )  that SAODAP could be retained but given 
specifically detailed program authority as 
well as the budgetary control it already haC. 
The 3-year authorization for SAODAF explred in 1975. The Ford 
Admlnlstratlon took the posltlon that the agency's duratlon should not be 
extended. The emergency s ~ t u a t i o c  that had called fcr tb.e extraoralnary 
measure no lonaer exlsted, the Adrnlnlstratlcn rnalntalned, an5 therefore tke 
c l ~ s - y , e s s  sf +~-g=t-ng ~ f c e - ~ ~  ~ T C J - - ; - -  - - .. i. - .. - c -,-A .. - - - C - - - - -  ~ L \ F I . L ~ $ ~ .  C f f C r Z 5  St2-15 L E  Iff: 
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to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, which had been 'established by the 
same statute as SAODAP. General policy concerning all drug matters were to 
be developed by several Cabinet committees as well as by the Strategy Council 
on Drug Abuse, also created by the SAODAP law. 
In spite of the Ford policy, SAODAP never entirely faded away. In 1976, 
Congress amended the SAODAP statute to establish a successor agency -- the 
Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) -- on a scaled-down basis, the new office 
being smaller in size than SAODAP and lacking its powerful tool of budget 
review. 
President Ford, who was defeated in 1976 in his bid for re-election, 
declined to implement the ODAP amendment. In March 1977, Ford's successor -- 
President Jimmy Carter -- filled the vacant ODAP Director position with Dr. 
Peter Bourne. Dr. Bourne was confirmed by the Senate in late May and 
installed in office in June. A month later, President Carter submitted a plan 
for the reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, which 
included a provision for the a olition of ODAP. 3 The plan (Reorganization Plan No. 1 ,  1977) was not disa proved by Congress, and ODAP went out of 
existence in early 1978. In all the successor agency to SAODAP was in 
operation for little more than a half-year. 
After ODAP's demise, however, Dr. Bourne became a presidential assistant 
for international health and drug abuse and, as such, oversaw the operations 
of a drug policy unit within the Domestic Policy Staff. After Dr. Bourne's 
resignation, in mid-1978, the unit was supervised by the former Deputy 
Director of 0DAP;Lee Dogoloff. The Reagan Administration has continued 
roughly the same arrangement, and in June 1982 the President issued an 
Executive order (No. 12368) officially designating the unit the "Drug Abuse 
Policy 0fficeW,.and naming a director (Dr. Carlton Turner) to be "primarily 
responsible for assisting the President in formulating policy .for, and in 
coordinating and overseeing, international as well as domestic drug abuse 
functions by all Executive agencies." 
Alternatives to a Drug Czar 
If we accept the proposition that the various Federal drug law enforcement 
efforts, or the drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts, .suffer from a 
lack of coordinated policies and goals, is a super-agency -- i.e., a druq 
czar -- the only sclution? Certainly, otl-,er ways of approaching thls problem 
have been conceived and tried during the past ten years. 
First, the same legislation that established SAODAP also created a 
Strategy Council, comprised of the department and agency heads who had the 
greatest interest in the drug problem, the SAODAP director, and other 
officials "as the President may deein appropriate." The mandate o f  the 
Council is to develop a "comprehensive, coordinated long-term Federal 
strategy for all drug abuse prevention functions and all drug traffic 
prevention functionsw of any agency of the Federal Government.' The strategy 
is to be reviewed and revised at least once a year. It is intended to cover 
h ~ t h  h r h ~ e  y 2 ; i t ~ ~  c ? ; e c 5 i y 7 e s  z r d  c > e r a t i c ? z l  ~ a t t e r s ;  Certainly the c 2 s o  
could be made that in the policy-making area, the Strategy Council could 
perform much of the function of a drug czar. The question is, after a 
strategy has Seen framed and promulgated, who will follow up? Those who 
support rhe super-agency idea maintain that continual monitoring is required - ,. ,, see ::;a= z s z r a z e g y  is impleRencsC. ( 1 : c z ~ ' :  altkough the legislatlex 
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requiring the establishment of the Council has never been repealed, the one 
Strategy prepared by the Reagan Administration, for 1982, involved 
participation by government agencies only, without the members of the public 
specified by amendments enacted in 1976). 
The second alternative -- in the law enforcement field -- is embodied, at 
least partially, by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) itself. 
Established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, the agency was intended by 
President Nixon to be the final answer to those who were charging that 
enforcement was in disarray due to inter-agency rivalries and lack of 
cooperation. Absorbing the manpower of three separate organizations, along 
with all Customs personnel who specialized in drug law enforcement, DEA was 
meant -- by embracing the majority of enforcement people within one 
organizational structure -- to provide a "unified command" in the 
"counteroffensive" against drug abuse. Despite thls move, which did not 
involve the narcotics control efforts of the State Department or the Coast 
Guard, the rivalry problems have continued, according to many observers. 
Cited most frequently as the biggest trouble area is the relationship between 
DEA and Customs. Also, until the recent shift within the Justice Department 
(Jan. 21, 1982) that gave the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with DEA over drug 
law enforcement, the former agency was inactive in the field, thus providing 
its agents with little incentive to share intelligence or otherwise cooperate 
with their DEA brethren. 
The third coordinating mechanism that .has been tried -- by Presidents 
Nixon, Ford, and Reagan -- is the inter-agency committee. The Ford 
Administration argued against the extension of SAODA? on the grounds that the 
agency had achieved its purpose as an emergency measure and that the time had 
come to return to normal institutional structure and procedure. In answer to 
the contention that a continued White House-level agency was necessary to 
give the anti-drug effort the needed "clout," Administration defenders 
poicted out that if this line were followed with respect to every important 
Federal undertaking, there would be an overwhelming number of White House 
agencies. Furthermore, it was held that a more effective and appropriate way 
to achieve coordination was the one recommended by a special task force of 
the President's Domestic Council in the fall of 1975 and subsequently taken 
by President Ford: creation of a Cabinet Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention 
and a Cabinet Committee on Drug Law Enforcement. The members of the latter 
were the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Treasury and of 
Transportation, with the DEA Administrator acting as Executive Director. The 
two committees were modeled on the Cabinet Committee for International 
1;aY-n ,,,=its Cantrol, created by fsrmer President Nipn- .,,., which the Donestic 
Council group evaluated as having been "quite successful." 
Growing out of the two cabinet committees created by President Ford was 
the so-called "Principals Group," comprised of the chiefs of the operating 
agencies having the greatest responsibility for drug abuse control. The 
group was at one time given high marks for resolving confl-icts and promoting 
cooperation, especially among the enforcement agencies. (An expanded version 
of the Principals Group is still functioning, under ~ n e  designation "White 
House Oversight Working GroupItt meeting once a month. A separste entity, the 
"Working Group on Dru@ Supply Reduction" is concern,e",ith law enforcemenk 
nr-,, '/ - . 
Finally, :he Reagan Administratior. has established its own versions of the 
cabinet cornnittee: the Cabinet Ccuncil on Legal Policy, chaired by t h e  
Attorney General, and - -  in connection with tPe President's new anti-eruq 
- r = . c : .  - 7 .  L>3=1T>-e  - -  - - -  - -  - -L .k1 r i3  125;: f ; r = E  1;;- ' 2 "p:r.cf= " m , F = t e f  c:. Z r q 2 ' i Z E z  z y ; ~ ~ ,  
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also chaired by the Attorney General. 
IV. Summary Discussion 
The argument over the drug czar proposals reflects a disagreement over the 
Value and appropriateness of various kinds of government mechanisms. Neither 
side denies the need for coordination, both in policy-making and in 
operations, although there is disagreement over the degree to which it has 
been achieved by the Reagan Administration under the present system. 
Essentially, the opponents of the czar concept see it as' hostile to the 
cabinet system of government. That system allots authority and 
responsibility to various departments along reasonably coherent 
jurisdictional lines, they argue, and when areas of responsibility overlap -- 
as frequently happens -- the appropriate mechanism for achieving coordination 
is one of an inter-cabinet nature. A special "overlordw agency of any kind 
depreciates the system, opponents say. 
On the other side, proponents have been dissatisfied with the 
inter-cabinet and inter-agency structures tried in the past. While many of 
them may agree that the czar solution does violate the logic'of the cabinet 
system, they make the case that the drug problem is special -- that the 
dimensions of the threat and the necessary complexity of the government's 
response demand a departure from "business as usual." They hold that only a n  
entity with direct access to the President -- and one with' budget review 
authority as well as the power to influence actual agency operations -- can 
SUCCeSSfUlly overcome the inherent impediments to coordination of effort 
among Federal agencies. 
To what extent does past experience offer guidance for judging the above 
positions? 
Although appraisals made both by Members of Congress and executive branch 
officials are available, it is difficult to form a clear idea of the results 
of the various approaches taken. In one of the few outsider assessments of 
SAODAP, a political scientist -- writing in 1981 -- examined the agency from 
the aspect of the light it shed on styles of Presidential management. While 
noting certain early successes, G. Larry Mays pointed to an eventual failure 
in meeting original expectations (The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse 
Prevention: Drug Coctrol During the Kixon Administratiori. International 
Journal of Public Administration, v. 3, 1981). The reason he cited was an 
apparent loss of confidence in the agency's director, Dr. Jerome Jaffe, by 
influential presidential aides and thus, presumably, also by the President. 
Crediting President Nixon wlth a genulne interest in the drug problem, 
Mays noted that Dr. Jaffers contact man in the Nlxon Whit-e House was Egil 
("BuB") Krogh, a trusted h~gn-level alde who could guarafltee that the SAOCAP 
dlrector wouid have ready access to  he P r e s ~ d e n t .  Eowever, Mays stated, 
"after Jaffee waivered on the matter of replacrng ~ r .  [ ~ e r t r a m ]  Brown of the 
National Institute of Mental Health, Krogh was no longer his contact and he 
T . - " C  . T O : P ~ ~ - F ~  + -  + z l l m -  7 . 1 -  A-h h l =  n C  * h e  V I I . . .  - 7 . n - h r  - - -  - -  -. - 2 - - -  ? = ~ P C  = n  t h e  1 7 h l t ~  
3ouse." Thls, Nays concluded, marked "an end to Jaffe's effective contact 
wlth the President and consequently a loss of influence." Under the next 
C l r e c t ~ r ,  2oSert DuPort, the agency was moved physically out of the Executive 
O f f ~ C e  of =he Presldent ( E O P )  and located ln Rockvllle, Maryland, and h-as 
" c q = r - -  7 .- =i - r  - c .  2 E . . . C f  I t S  I T F b Z t  2 .  E . l e  
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process of Presidential decision-making. 
Professional employees of the agencies directly responsible for dealing 
with the drug problem offer varying informal evaluations of SAODAP. While 
many appear to welcome any move that highlights the drug problem and that 
projects the image of a higher level of priority, others express the doubt 
that any formal entity, such as SAODAP or the proposed drug czar office, can 
accomplish what is intended. According to the latter, to the extent that 
there indeed remain coordination difficulties -- after all of the 
consolidating moves of the past 10 years -- what is needed is not a new 
overlord office but rather (1) a definite. and sustained interest in the 
problem on the part of the President and (2) one high-level Presidential aide 
whc has access to the President, to monitor the operating' agencies and to 
bring important conflicts to the President's attention. One veteran 
enforcement official has commented privateiy, "We've already had a drug czar, 
the only kind that works, and that was Bud KrOgh." (See above.) 
Ultimately, in trying to answer the question "Do we need a drug czar?", 
the Congress is faced with a series of additional q u e s t i O n ~ ,  of both a 
theoretical and a pragmatic nature. Is the general principle sound? Does the 
concept of a super-agency, which would coordinate and direct a group of 
operating agencies having some common function, do violence to.the logic of 
Executive Branch departmental structure? Is that structure ' sacrosanct, or 
does the growth of the White House Staff and the EOP indicate that in many 
respects it has already been found wanting? To solve a coordination problem 
in any area, is there a better and more appropriate alternative to Creation 
of a super-agency, such as the cabinet -committee or other similar 
inter-agency mechanism? Alternatively, have such arrangements been fruitful 
in the past? Assuming that there are indeed exceptional problems that warrant 
creation of a super-agency, is drug abuse one of them? Are the present 
organizations and arrangements -- the Reagan Administration's Cabinet Council 
on Legal Policy, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, the 
border interdiction task force program under the direction of the Vice 
President, the Drug Abuse Policy Office in the EOP, and the general lead 
taken by the Attorney General in the drug enforcement field -- working or 
not? Have they been given enough time to demonstrate their potential? Can 
any office such as one of those now proposed be successful if the President 
in office is not in sympathy with the idea? On the other hand, is it not the 
responsibility of Congress to create effective government institutions that 
will survive the preferences and style of a particular administration? 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 3326 (Shaw) 
Establishes the lCOffice of the Dlrector of Natlonal and International Drug 
Operations and Policy" to ensure (1) the development of a natlonal pollcy 
- - b;;tn r e s ~ e c c  zo illegal drkgs, ( )  =he d ~ r e c t l o n  and coordlriac~on of a _ -  
Federal agencres lnvolved rn the effort to lmpiemenr. such a pollcy, a n d  ( 3 1  
that a single hlgh-level offrclal, "accountable to the Congress and the 
American people," will be chargee wzth the responsi5lllty of coordlnatlng the 
- ~ 7 5 - , 3 ,  < - ? - a c * .  r n  hf I _ I m I C _ e c  C L T ~ C  - - -  - - 7 7 ,  . - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ? a C h l \ ' - C C  - - - -  - -  - ' " T ?  " C , 3 T S Y 1 ^ "  - -.- 4-t- - ,  - - - - 
respect to the lllegal arug problem. Speclfles that there shall be both a 
Dlrector and a Deputy Dlrector -- the Dlrector to be appointed by the 
Presiier: from among the Vlce ?resslCer.t an2 the hea2s o f .  the e x e c ~ t ~ v f  
Cepart~ento of the U . S .  and the Deputy 32rector also to be appolzted by :fie 
-' ' V E  srnz=e. ?rocis-:_ 15 r ,zcf 3r€cSeE7.: " L C  F-z";' '5i-ICe a2= zzssezt ,-,., 
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Specifically for the participation of the Office in the development of 
budgetary priorities and allocations of the operative agencies. 
H.R. 4028 (Hughes, Sawyer, Smith of Fla., an8 Gilman) 
Reestablishes an Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP). in the Executive 
Office of the President. Amends the Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and 
Rehabilitation Act to revise the authority (still contained in the statute) 
of ODAP, to provide for a Deputy Director for Drug Abuse Prevention and a 
Deputy Director for Drug Enforcement. Sets forth authorities for the 
Director of the office, which include .the establishment of policy and 
priorities for all Federal drug abuse functions and the coordination and 
oversight of such functions. Stipulates that the Vice-president may be 
appoidted Director. Among specific powers provided is review of all annual 
budgets of departments and agencies engaged in drug abuse functions. 
Authorizes appropriations of $500,000 for FY84 for carrying out the act. 
Requires the Director to submit a written report to Congress annually on the 
activities conducted under the statute. H.R. 3664 introduced July 26, 1983; 
referred jointly to the Committees on the Judiciary and on Energy and 
Commerce. H.R. 4028, a clean bill in lieu.of H.R. 3664, introduced Sept. 29; 
referred to the Committees on Judiciary and on Energy and Commerce. Ordered 
to be reported (amended) by the Judiciary Committee and referred to Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, Oct. 4. 
S. 1787 (Biden et al.) 
National Narcotids Act of 1983. Creates an "Office of th'e Director of 
pia+ ,,anal ; and International Drug Operations and Policy", to be headed by a 
Director and a Deputy Director who are appointed by the President, by and 
with the consent of the Senate. Provides that the Director is authorized to 
(1) develop, review, implement, and enforce U.S. Government policy with 
respect to illegal drugs; (2) direct and coordinate all U.S. 'Government 
efforts to halt the flow into, and sale and use of illegal drugs within the 
U.S.; (3) develop, in concert with the appropriate governmental entities, 
budgetary priorities and allocations relating to control of illegal drugs; 
and (4) coordinate the collection and dissemination of information necessary 
to implement government policy with respect to illegal drugs. Authorizes 
appropriations of $500,000 for FY84 for carrying out the act. Introduced 
Aug. 4 ,  1983; referred to Judiciary. Reported, without amendment, Aug. 4. 
Written report filed Oct. 25 (S.Rept; 98-278). (Contents of bill added by 
floor amendment on Oct. 26, 1983, to H.R. 3959, a supplemental appropriation 
bill that passed z!-~e Senate 3ct. 27, 19E3. A ~ ~ e c S m e n t  CroppeB ;n conference.) 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
11/15/83 -- The drug czar" and drug commission provisions 
of the Senate-passed supplemental appropria.tions 
biil were dropped by the Eouse-Senace conferecce 
committee. 
10/26/83 -- The Senate added the contents of S. 17B7, a 
so-called c z a r "  - 2 1 1 ,  tc 5 . F .  ? ? ? a ,  c - ~ n - l o - n n ~ = l  
- - - -  - - - 
approprlatlons bill that was subsequently passed by 
the Senate on Oct. 27. Also added was a proposal to 
create a "Commlsslon on Drug 1nterdlct:cc and 
Enforcement. 
09/15/83 -- The House Subcommittee on Crime approved a clean 
a bill to amend Title I1 of the Drug Abuse Office 
and Treatment Act for the purpose of recreating 
the Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the Executive 
Office of the President (EoP). Deputy Directors 
both for Drug Enforcement and for Drug ~ b u s e  
Prevention would be appointed under the bill's 
provisions. An amendment accepted in subcommittee 
mark-up would allow the President to name the 
Vice President as Director. The bill was introduced 
Sept. 29 as H.R. 4027. 
08/04/83 -- An altered version of the Administration omnibus 
crime control bill was reported by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee (S. 1762). A separate bill 
to establish a "drug czar" office was also 
reported (S. 1787). 
03/23/83 -- The White House announced the creation of a new 
drug interdiction group headed by Vice ?resident 
Bush. The National Narcotics Border Interdiction 
System (NNBIS) was charged with coordinating the 
work of Federal agencies that have responsibilities 
for interdiction of sea-borne, air-borne and 
a ~ r ~ s s - b ~ r d e r  importation of narcotics and other 
dangerous drugs -- principally the Customs Service, 
the Coast Guard ,"and the armed ' s'ervices. . 
01/14/83 -- President Reagan withheld his approval of 
H.R. 3963 (97th Congress), thus exercising a 
pocket veto. He was especially critical of a 
provision establishing a "drug czarw office to 
coordinate Federal drug law enforcement. 
12/20/82 -- A scaled-down version of the Violent Crime and Drug 
Enforcement Improvement Act (H.R. 3963, 97th 
Congress) was cleared for the Presid.ent. It 
contained provisions for the creation of a so-called 
"drug czar" office to coordinate Federal drug 
law enforcement. 
1C/li/E2 - -  T5e Presieent ar~nounce8 a r,ajor new drive 
against illicit drug trafficking. Subsequently 
designated the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 
(OCDE) task force program, the initiative 
involved creation of 12 regional task forces 
for the investigation and prosecution of major 
trafficking cases. It was anticipated to .- 
require the hiring of 1,200 cew investigators 
and prosecutors. 
06/24/82 -- Ey Executive Order the President established the 
nr..rr -. J P " 3 : c e  pcl l"T7 " C C - - c  - -  'he ? f f l T E  ,.= p ^ ' - " ' .  - - - - - - - -  
Deve1opner.t (EOP) for the purpose of performing 
the dutles specifled under Tltle I 1  of the Drug 
ASuse Cffzce and Treatrent Act. Accordlnq to the 
~ r d e r ,  zhe 3:rectcr of the Cfflce would be 
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President in formulating policy for, and in 
coordinating and overseeing, international as 
well as domestic drug abuse functions by all 
Executive agencies." Dr. Carlton Turner, the 
President's senior advisor on drug abuse policy, 
was appointed Director. 
01/29/82 -- The President announced creation of the Cabinet 
Council on Legal Policy, to be chaired by the 
Attorney General. The Council was charged with 
the review of matters pertaining to 
interdepartmental aspects of law enforcement 
policy, with an initial emphasis on narcotics 
enforcement and immigration and refugee policy. 
Subsequently, the Council formed the Working 
Group for Drug Supply Reduction, under the 
chairmanship of the Associate Attorney General. 
01/28/82 -- President Reagan announced the establishment of 
a special task force to combat illicit drug 
traffic in South Florida. Composed of officials 
from a number of Federal agencies, to work with 
State and local authorities, the task force was 
placed under the direction of Vice President 
Bush. 
01/21/82 A-- The Federal 'Bureau of Investigation was-given 
concurrent jurisdiction, with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, over the enforcement of da?gerous 
drug laws. Under the new arrangement, the DEA is 
required to report to the Attorney General through 
the FBI Director. 
07/00/81 -- Dr. Carlton Turner was appointed as President 
Reagan's "senior advisor on drug abuse policy. 
03/00/78 -- The Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) was 
terminated. ODAP Director Peter Bourne was 
designated a presidential assistant for 
international health and drug abuse and, 
a s  such, supervised the operation of a unit 
of the Dsrnestic Poiicy Staff charge3 with 
formulation of policy on matters pertainig to 
drug abuse. This arrangement was continued 
under his successor, Lee Dogoloff. 
07/15/77 -- President Carter submitted Reorganization 
Plan No. 1 of 1977 to Congress. The plan proposed 
a reorganizaticn of the Zxecutive Office of the 
President, one aspect of which was abolition 
of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy. 
Strategies would be "revitalized." 
04/27/76 -- A presidential "Drug Abuse Message to the 
Congress" announced the creation of the Cabinet 
Committee on Drug Law Enforcement (CCDLE) and 
the Cabinet Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention, 
Treatment and Rehabilitation (CCDAPTR). Modeled 
on the Cabinet Committee on International 
Narcotics Control, established by President 
Nixon (see below), the two committees were 
charged With the development and implementation 
of overall Federal strategy and the strengthening 
of interagency coordination. 
03/19/76 -- Amendments to the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment 
Act became law. Among other things, they provided 
for the establishment of a successor agency to 
SAODAP, to be known as the Office o'f Drug Abuse 
Policy (ODAP), on a scaled-down basis, to be 
known as the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP). 
Subsequently, President Ford declined to implement 
the legislation and proposed a rescission of 
appropriations for the proposed agency. 
00/00/76 -- The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control was established, for the purpose . . of studying and reviewing, fr.0m.a unified 
perspective, the problem of narcotics abuse 
and its control. The initial panel included 
members from all standing committees with 
jurisdiction over significant aspects of drug 
abuse control. 
06/30/75 -- The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse 
Prevention statutory authorization expired. The 
Ford Administration declined to support extension. 
00/00/73 -- The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 
Administration (ADAMHA) was established in the 
Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare -- comprised of three institutes of equal 
status: the National Institute of Menzal HealtF., 
the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism, and the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse. The new agency was subsequently authorized 
by statute (Title I1 of P.L. 93-282). 
00/00/73 -- The Drug Enforcement Administration was established 
by Reorganizat~on Flan Kc. 2 of 1973. To create 
the new Justice Department agency, the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was combiged with' 
the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the 
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C u s ~ o m s  Service perscncel principally involved 
in drug law enforcement. 
those (1) providing statutory backing for the 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, 
with specific authorities and appropriation 
authorizations for three fiscal years, at the end 
of which the agency was to be terminated, , ( 2 )  
establishing a Strategy Council, to be appointed 
by the President, for formulation and continual 
revision of a "comprehensive, coordinated 
long-term Federal strategy for all drug abuse 
prevention functions and all drug traffic 
prevention functions conducted, sponsored, or 
supported by any department or agency of the 
Federal Government. I' (3) further expansion of 
Federal treatment and prevention grant programs, 
including initiation of a program of formula 
grants to the States, and ( 4 )  establishment of a 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, within the 
National Institute of Mental Health, to administer 
all programs and authorities of the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect 
to drug abuse prevention functions. 
06/00/71 -- President Richard Nixon appointed Dr. Jerome . 
Jaffe, a psychiatrist, as a special consultant 
to the President for narcotics and dangerous 
drugs and in a Message to Congress announced 
the establishment of the Special Action Office 
for Drug Abuse Prevention, located within the 
Executive Office of the President,, to 
coordinate and broadly Cirect all Federal 
drug-abuse programs concerned with prevention, 
education, treatment, rehabilitation, training 
and research. 
10/15/68 -- The President signed P.L. 90-574, which contained 
amendments to the Community Mental Health Centers 
Act establishing the first program of Federal 
grants specifically for funding the treatment 
of narcotic addiction. 
00/00/68 -- Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, the 
E,, Leac .- of Karcstics (Treasury) and the Sareac 
of Drug Abuse Control (FDA) were combined into 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
in the Justice Department. 
11/00/63 -- The President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic 
and Drug Abuse ("Prettyman Commissionw) issued 
its iinai repsrt. A r . 0 ~ 5  recommendations h-as 
one that tne Fresident appoint a Special 
Assistant for Narcotic and Drug Abuse, from the 
White House staff, to provide continuous advice 
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attack on drug abuse. 
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